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LOCKING DOWN OUR BORDERS: HOW
ANTI-IMMIGRATION SENTIMENT LED TO
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION AND
THE EROSION OF FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Jamie Nielsen*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. History of the Real ID Act
Feeding off of the wave of anti-immigration sentiment
following the events of September 11th 2001, the Real ID Act
was designed to quell illegal immigration by implementing a
national ID card system and bolstering border security. The Act
was first introduced by Wisconsin U.S. Representative James
Sensenbrenner as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
1
Prevention Act of 2004. Due to heavy opposition in the Senate,
2
the Real ID provisions were dropped prior to passage.
However, it was reintroduced in 2005 and attached to legislation
that House leaders were certain would pass in the Senate.3 Thus,
* B.S., Bryant University, 2001; J.D., Brooklyn Law School, expected
2010. The author wishes to thank her parents for providing endless support
and encouragement, as well as the members of the Journal of Law and Policy
for all of their hard work.
1
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108–458, § 7212, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
2
Media Matters, O’Reilly Misleadingly Claimed Real ID Act Passed
Senate 100-0, MEDIA MATTERS, May 13, 2005, http://mediamatters.org/
items/200505130002.
3
“[A]pparently recognizing that the stand-alone bill lacked support in the
Senate, the House leadership attached the legislation to the House version of
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the bill was passed as a rider to the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief, 2005.4 As noted by one legal scholar, “[i]t
would have been a serious political liability for a congressperson
to vote against funding for the war on terror and tsunami relief.
So it is unsurprising that there was no debate on, no hearings
on, and no public vetting of the act.”5
The Real ID Act is most notorious for requiring a national
identification card system, which in turn requires states to fund
and implement a system of federally standardized drivers
licenses.6 The cards will contain the personal information of the
holder and will be equipped with machine-readable technology,
allowing them to be scanned.7 The cards will not only be
necessary for activities such as flying or visiting federal
buildings, but also for “‘everyday transactions,’ such as
receiving government benefits, voting, or applying for a job.
The private sector will also begin mandating a Real ID card for
everyday purposes.”8 In order to obtain the new cards, people
will be required to present documentation to their state
Department of Motor Vehicles proving their “name, date of
birth, Social Security number, their principal residence . . . and
9
that they are lawfully in the U.S.” In addition to excluding
many individuals living within the states from receiving an ID
card,10 the law will be outrageously costly.11
the emergency funding bill.” Id.
4
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 231
(2005).
5
Anita Ramasastry, Why the ‘Real ID’ Act, Which Requires National
Identity Cards, is a Real Mess, FINDLAW, Aug. 10, 2005, http://writ.news.
findlaw.com/ramasastry/20050810.html.
6
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act §§ 201–207.
7
Id. at § 202(b).
8
New York Civil Liberties Union, Why Oppose the Real ID Act?,
http://dev.nyclu.org/realid/why_oppose (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
9
Ramasastry, supra note 5; see also Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act § 202(c)(1)–(2).
10
The documentation requirements will prevent not only illegal
immigrants already residing in the United States from receiving ID cards, but
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While opponents have voiced strong criticism regarding the
cost, invasion of privacy, identity theft, and immigrant
discrimination that accompany the identification cards,12 little has
been said about the other provisions of the Act—in particular
Section 102(c)13, designed to amend Section 102(c) of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996.14 Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 aimed to deter illegal
crossings at United States borders with two protective fences
“along the 14 miles of the international land border of the
United States, starting at the Pacific Ocean and extending
eastward.”15 This project was expanded following September
11th, when Congress began to play off of America’s terrorism

also many legal immigrants. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS ABOUT DRIVER’S LICENSES NOW THAT FINAL REAL ID
REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED (2008), available at http://www.nilc.org/
immspbs/DLs/QA_re_DLs_post-regs_2008-02-27.pdf. Further, legal citizens
may have difficulty obtaining the required documents due to factors such as
age or poverty. See Joan Fridland, Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Presentation
at the Immigration Advocates Network Webinar: Immigrants, Driver’s
Licenses, and the Real ID Act: Requirements, Implementation, and Options
Available to States (Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.democracyin
action.org/dia/organizationsORG/NILC/images/REAL ID webinar NILC.ppt.
11
The DHS [Department of Homeland Security] originally estimated
that the law would cost $23.1 billion. The final regulations slash this
estimate to $9.9 billion over 11 years by relying on the ridiculous
premise that only 75 percent of licensed drivers will seek to obtain a
Real ID. As of February 2008, Congress had set aside only $80
million to help pay for implementing Real ID across the entire
country.
N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 8.
12
See, e.g., id.; Real Nightmare, Opposition Voices, http://www.real
nightmare.org/opposition/9/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
13
Section 102 of the Real ID Act is titled “Waiver of Legal
Requirements Necessary for Improvement of Barriers at Borders.”
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102.
14
8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (c) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers at
Border).
15
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104–208,
§ 102(b)(1), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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fears in order to strengthen immigration controls. Amendments
such as those made in the Secure Fence Act of 200616 provided
for “reinforced fencing along not less than 700 miles of the
southwest border.”17
Similarly, while the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act originally provided for waiver of
provisions of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 “to the extent the
Attorney General determines necessary to ensure expeditious
construction of the barriers and roads,”18 Section 102(c)(1) of
the Real ID Act amended this to read:
IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall have the
authority to waive all legal requirements such Secretary,
in such Secretary’s sole discretion, determines necessary
to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and
roads under this section. Any such decision by the
Secretary shall be effective upon being published in the
Federal Register.19
The Department of Homeland Security was created as an
executive agency by President Bush following September 11th
and assumed several functions previously held by other
governmental agencies.20 In particular, the authority previously
granted to the Attorney General in Section 102 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
was assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security.21 Under the
new provisions of Section 102 of the Real ID Act, the Secretary
16

Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638
(2006).
17
8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (b)(1)(A) (West 2009) (Improvement of
Barriers at Border).
18
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act § 102(c).
19
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109–13, § 102(c)(1), 119
Stat. 231 (2005).
20
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, § 1511,
1517, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
21
Id.
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now has sole discretion to waive any and all laws he deems
necessary for expeditious construction of the border fence, 670
miles of which had a completion deadline of December 31,
2008.22 Additionally, the Real ID Act significantly narrows
judicial review of the Secretary’s discretionary decisions:
IN GENERAL.—The district courts of the United States
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all causes or
claims arising from any action undertaken, or any
decision made, by the Secretary of Homeland Security
pursuant to paragraph (1). A cause of action or claim
may only be brought alleging a violation of the
Constitution of the United States. The court shall not
have jurisdiction to hear any claim not specified in this
subparagraph . . . . Any cause or claim brought pursuant
to subparagraph (A) shall be filed not less than 60 days
after the date of the action or decision made by the
Secretary of Homeland Security. A claim shall be barred
unless it is filed within the time specified . . . . An
interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of the
district court may be reviewed only upon petition for a
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States.23
Thus, as this Note will argue, Section 102(c) of the Real ID
Act is unconstitutional, violating the separation of powers
doctrine by granting entirely too much power to one individual
while leaving little room for judicial review. Additionally, when
given the opportunity to review the constitutionality of the Act
22

8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (b)(1)(B) (West 2009) (Improvement of
Barriers at Border). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act specified “370 miles, or other mileage determined by the
Secretary” shall be completed by December 31, 2008. Id. The Department of
Homeland Security committed to having 670 miles of fencing completed by
December 31, 2008 (370 miles of pedestrian fencing and 300 miles of vehicle
fencing). OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG09-56, PROGRESS IN ADDRESSING SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE OPERATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRUCTING THE SOUTHWEST BORDER FENCE 15
(2009).
23
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(2).
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in Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff,24 the Supreme Court denied
certiorari and failed to perform its job as a check on legislative
power. The Note will begin with an overview of Chertoff and
the district court’s rationale in upholding the Real ID Act. Part
II will examine the historical importance of the separation of
powers doctrine, including application of the doctrine in
significant case law. Part III will demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of the Real ID Act by comparing the Real ID
Act to other separation of powers cases. Part IV examines the
devastating results of such legislation and the Supreme Court’s
inaction. Finally, Part V proposes a solution to redress the
consequences of the Court’s inaction.
B. Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff
In September of 2007, at the direction of the Department of
Homeland Security, the Army Corps of Engineers began
construction of the border fence, along with a road and drainage
structures, in an area known as the San Pedro Riparian National
Conservation Area (SPRNCA) in Arizona.25 The SPRNCA
consists of approximately 57,000 acres of public land in Cochise
County, Arizona.26 The San Pedro River, “one of the last freeflowing rivers in the United States”27 runs though the SPRNCA
and the area has been described as “one of the most biologically
diverse areas of the United States.”28 Congress officially

24

Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C.
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2962 (2008).
25
Id. at 121.
26
United States Department of the Interior, San Pedro RNCA, http://blm
.gov/az/st/en/prog/blm_special_areas/ncarea/sprnca.html (last visited Sept.
30, 2009) [hereinafter San Pedro RNCA].
27
Press Release, Defenders of Wildlife & Sierra Club, Conservation
Groups Ask Federal Government to Consider Border Fence’s Overall Impact
to Wildlife, Public Lands in Arizona (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.
defenders.org/newsroom/press_releases_folder/2007/10_01_2007_groups_app
eal_to_feds_on_border_fence.php?ht=.
28
Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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designated it as a conservation area on November 18, 1988.29
Recognizing the ecological significance of the SPRNCA and
the potential damage of fencing,30 Defenders of Wildlife filed a
motion for a temporary restraining order in district court. The
motion alleged that the Bureau of Land Management (the agency
charged with managing the SPRNCA) conducted an inadequate
Environmental Assessment prior to granting a perpetual right of
way to the Department of Homeland Security for fence
construction31 and that the bureau also erred in determining that
an Environmental Impact Statement was not required by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.32 Defenders of
Wildlife further argued that the right-of-way grant violated the
Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988, which required the
Bureau of Land Management to “manage the SPRNCA ‘in a
manner that conserves, protects, and enhances the riparian area
and the aquatic, wildlife, archeological, paleontological,
scientific, cultural, educational, and recreational resources of the
29

San Pedro RNCA, supra note 26.
The primary purpose for the special designation is to protect and
enhance the desert riparian ecosystem, a rare remnant of what was
once an extensive network of similar riparian systems throughout the
American Southwest. One of the most important riparian areas in the
United States, the San Pedro River runs through the Chihuahuan
Desert and the Sonoran Desert in Southeastern Arizona. The river’s
stretch is home to 84 species of mammals, 14 species of fish, 41
species of reptiles and amphibians, and 100 species of breeding
birds. It also provides invaluable habitat for 250 species of migrant
and wintering birds and contains archaeological sites representing the
remains of human occupation from 13,000 years ago.
Id.
30

Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 121 n.1 (“The challenged
fence construction requires excavation on up to 225 of the SPRNCA’s 58,000
acres, and the proposed fence segments will cover approximately 9,938 feet
at the border when completed.”).
31
Id. at 121. The Bureau of Land Management “concluded that the
proposed fencing would have no significant impact on the environment when
paired with certain mitigation measures and that an Environmental Impact
Statement (‘IS’) was not therefore required by the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (‘NEPA’).” Id. (citations omitted).
32
Id.
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conservation area’ and to ‘only allow such uses of the
conservation area’ that further the purposes for which it was
established.”33 The court granted the temporary restraining
order, noting that “plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits with respect to their NEPA
claims and that the balance of equities favored plaintiffs,”34 and
construction of the border fence was halted.35
However, approximately two weeks later, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, used his discretionary
powers to waive twenty statutes in their entirety (most of them
environmental) in order to continue the fence construction.36
33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
On October 26, 2007, the Secretary’s decision to waive the following
statutes was announced in the Federal Register: The National Environmental
Policy Act (Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 852 (Jan. 1, 1970) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et
seq.)), the Endangered Species Act (Pub. L. 93–205, 87 Stat. 884 (Dec. 28,
1973) (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.)), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act) (Act of June 30, 1948, c.
758, 62 Stat. 1155 (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)), the National Historic
Preservation Act (Pub. L. 89–665, 80 Stat. 915 (Oct. 15, 1966) (16 U.S.C.
470 et seq.)), the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.), the
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), the Archeological Resources
Protection Act (Pub. L. 96–95, 16 U.S.C. 470aa et seq.), the Safe Drinking
Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.), the Noise Control Act (42 U.S.C. 4901
et seq.), the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.), the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 U.S.C. 9601
et seq.), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (Pub. L. 94–579, 43
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (Pub. L. 73–
121, 48 Stat. 401, 16 U.S.C. 661 et seq.), the Archaeological and Historic
Preservation Act (Pub. L. 86–523, 16 U.S.C. 469 et seq.), the Antiquities
Act (16 U.S.C. 431 et seq.), the Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities
Act (16 U.S.C. 461 et seq.), the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988
(Pub. L. 100–696, 16 U.S.C. 460xx et seq.), the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
(Pub. L. 90–542, 16 U.S.C. 1281 et seq.), the Farmland Protection Policy
Act (7 U.S.C. 4201 et seq.) and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
551 et seq.). Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as Amended
by Section 102 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and as Amended by the Secure
34
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Additionally, Chertoff stated that he reserved the “authority to
make further waivers from time to time.”37 Using the highly
subjective standards set forth in the Act, Chertoff stated that the
SPRNCA “is an area of high illegal entry” in which “there is
presently a need to erect fixed and mobile barriers . . . and
roads.”38 Therefore, he deemed it “necessary” to exercise his
waiver authority and, as a result, the temporary restraining order
was vacated.39
In response, Defenders of Wildlife filed an amended
complaint in district court, alleging “that the waiver provision of
the REAL ID Act violates separation of powers principles
embodied in Articles I and II of the Constitution because it
‘impermissibly delegates legislative powers to the DHS
Secretary, a politically-appointed Executive Branch official.”40
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the case fell precisely
within the Court’s holding in Clinton v. City of New York,41
where provisions of the Line Item Veto Act were found
unconstitutional because Presidential repeal of laws is not
constitutionally permissible.42 The defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint43 on grounds that the Real ID Act’s waiver
provisions constituted a permissible delegation of legislative
power to the Executive Branch under the Court’s
“nondelegation” jurisprudence because “it provides the Secretary
with an ‘intelligible principle’ that ‘clearly delineate[s] the
general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the
boundaries of th[e] delegated authority.’”44 Additionally, the
defendants set forth the argument that “‘Congress may delegate
in even broader terms’ than otherwise permissible in matters of
Fence Act of 206, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,870 (Oct. 26, 2007).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 123.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 124 (citing Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)).
42
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998).
43
Defendants moved to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6). Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 123.
44
Id.
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immigration policy, foreign affairs, and national security,
because ‘the Executive Branch already maintains significant
independent control’ over these areas.”45
In issuing its opinion, the district court quickly dismissed the
plaintiff’s comparison to Clinton.46 The court held that the
repeal of laws in Clinton was distinguishable from the waiver of
laws at issue here.47 Whereas in Clinton repeal meant the
affected laws no longer had “any ‘legal force or effect’ under
any circumstance,”48 the waived laws at issue “retain[] the same
legal force and effect [they] had when [] passed by both houses
of Congress and presented to the President.”49 The court further
stated:
The fact that the laws no longer apply to the extent they
otherwise would have with respect to the construction of
border barriers and roads within the SPRNCA does not,
as plaintiffs argue, transform the waiver into an
unconstitutional ‘partial repeal’ of those laws. By that
logic, any waiver, no matter how limited in scope, would
violate Article I because it would allow the Executive
Branch to unilaterally ‘repeal’ or nullify the law with
respect to the limited purpose delineated by the waiver
legislation.50
With regard to the plaintiffs’ separation of powers argument,
the court cited the rationale from Smith v. Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y. that “‘the Supreme Court has widely permitted the
Congress to delegate its legislative authority to other branches,’
so long as the delegation is accompanied by sufficient
guidance.”51 Further, that delegation is permitted where
“Congress ‘lay[s] down . . . an intelligible principle to which

45

Id.
Id. at 124.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 126 (citing Smith v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 280 F. Supp.
2d 314, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
46
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the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated
authority] is directed to conform . . . .’”52 The Chertoff court
held that the provisions requiring that fencing be erected
specifically in areas “of high illegal entry,”53 “to deter illegal
crossings,”54 and that the Secretary only exercise his waiver
authority as he “determines necessary to ensure expeditious
construction of the barriers and roads”55 constituted “clearly
delineated” boundaries under which the Secretary was
authorized to act.56
The Chertoff court also found that the broad scope of the
Secretary’s power to waive “all legal requirements”57 that he
deems necessary in his “sole discretion”58 was not
59
Despite finding a lack of historical support
unconstitutional.
for such sweeping waiver authority,60 the court found that it was
constitutional because “under the nondelegation doctrine, the
relevant inquiry is whether the Legislative Branch has laid down
an intelligible principle to guide the Executive Branch, not the
scope of the waiver power.”61 The court further agreed with the
62
defendants that legislative delegations may be broader when the
subject matter is one over which the Executive Branch already
52

Id. at 127 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372
(1989)).
53
8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (a) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers at
Border).
54
Id.
55
Id. note (c)(1).
56
Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 127.
57
8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (c)(1) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers
at Border).
58
Id.
59
Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 129.
60
The Court cited a Congressional Research Service Memorandum
which stated “the REAL ID Act’s waiver provision appears to be
unprecedented in that it ‘contains notwithstanding language,’ provides a
secretary of an executive agency the authority to waive all laws such
secretary determines necessary, and directs the secretary to waive such
laws.” Id. at 128.
61
Id. at 129.
62
See supra text accompanying note 45.
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possesses considerable constitutional power.63 Therefore, because
the border fence falls under the Executive controlled areas of
foreign affairs and immigration control,64 the broad delegation of
authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security by the
legislature was constitutionally permissible.65
Following the district court’s dismissal with prejudice,
Defenders of Wildlife exercised the only available option under
the Act and petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court.66 Fourteen members of the U.S. House of
Representatives, numerous distinguished law professors, and
various organizations (ranging from environmental groups to the
United Church of Christ) filed Amicus briefs in support of the
67
petitioners. However, in June of 2008, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari.68 In a public statement, House Representative
Lamar Smith criticized the Supreme Court’s decision as allowing
border fences to be built “without legal restrictions or
interference from environmentalists.”69
Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
States sets forth basic guidelines for the Court to grant a petition

63

“When the area to which the legislation pertains is one where the
Executive Branch already has significant independent constitutional authority,
delegations may be broader than in other contexts.” Defenders of Wildlife,
527 F. Supp. 2d at 129 (citing Sierra Club v. Ashcroft, Civ. No. 04–272,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44244, at *17 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2005)).
64
Id. at 129.
65
Id.
66
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 128
S. Ct. 2962 (2008) (No. 07-1180).
67
Brief for Fourteen Members of the U.S. House of Representatives as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Defenders of Wildlife, 128 S. Ct.
2962 (No. 07–1180); Brief of William D. Araiza et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Defenders of Wildlife, 128 S. Ct. 2962 (No. 07–
1180); Brief of the National Advocacy Center of the Sisters of the Good
Shepherd et al. as Amici Curiae Support of Petitioners, Defenders of Wildlife,
128 S. Ct. 2962 (No. 07–1180).
68
Defenders of Wildlife, 128 S. Ct. 2962.
69
Gary Martin, Court’s Fence Ruling Strengthens Government Power,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 28, 2008, at 9B.
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for certiorari.70 Of those standards, one is particularly
pertinent—where “a state court or a United States court of
appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has
not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant
decisions of this Court” the court should grant certiorari.71 The
Court’s denial of certiorari without explanation has left
commentators at a loss, with some speculating that “the decision
served as a death knell for future legal challenges to the
fence,”72 and others holding out “hope that a second, separate
legal challenge may yet succeed.”73 Nevertheless, it is clear that
the Court should have granted certiorari because the district
court’s decision to uphold Section 102(c) of the Act “conflicts
with relevant decisions of”74 the Supreme Court by violating the
fundamental doctrine of separation of powers.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
A. Historical Significance of Separation of Powers
The Constitution clearly divides the power of the federal
government into three distinct branches, with Article I granting
legislative power to Congress,75 Article II giving executive
power to the President,76 and Article III vesting judicial power in
77
the Supreme Court. In The Federalist No. 47, James Madison
70

SUP. CT. R. 10.
Id. at 10(c).
72
Martin, supra note 69.
73
Border Fence Legal Waivers Still Under Threat in Second Lawsuit,
DEF. ENV’T ALERT, Jul. 8, 2008.
74
SUP. CT. R. 10(c).
75
“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
76
“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
77
“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
71

NIELSEN REVISED.DOC

4/28/2010 11:39 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

472

wrote that “the accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”78 Thus, the founding fathers recognized that in order
to maintain this democratic form of government, a reliable
method of reigning in branch power was essential.79
Thus, the constitutional system of checks and balances was
created, whereby “the President . . . may veto legislation; the
Senate may confirm or deny the President’s appointment of his
or her principal executive officers as well as federal judges; and
Congress, by exercising its impeachment power, may remove
judges and executive officers, including the President.”80 In
addition to these explicit grants of authority, the power of
judicial review stands as one of the most important
constitutionally implied checks.81 Chief Justice Marshall
categorically reinforced this principal in Marbury v. Madison,82
holding that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”83
78

THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Sherman F. Mittell,
ed., 1938).
79
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those
who administer each department the necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachment of the others . . . .
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition . . . . If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige
it to control itself.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 337 (James Madison) (Sherman F. Mittell, ed.,
1938).
80
CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 333 (2d ed.
2005).
81
Id.
82
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
83
Id. at 177.
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The separation of powers doctrine, and its accompanying
system of checks and balances, is a fundamental characteristic of
the American government. As stated by Professor Thomas
Sargentich, the doctrine continues to “serve the highly valued
ends of avoiding undue concentration of governmental power,
expanding representation and access to power, as well as
promoting deliberation and counteracting factional influence on
the government.”84 In Sargentich’s analysis of the separation of
powers, the “normally emphasized”85 function of “prevention of
concentrated power”86 is only part of the greater purpose served;
the doctrine also brings together different actors in an effort to
develop public policy. Legislation must filter through three
distinct arenas before impacting society.87 Thus, public policy
evolves from a broad base, more representative of the needs and
values of American citizens.88
The separation of powers doctrine “also multiplies the points
of access for citizens who wish to get involved . . . [and]
expands access to power in a society with great diversity and
89
Complementing
this
principle
of
social
division.”
comprehensive representation is Sargentich’s point that the
doctrine encourages discourse on varying societal attitudes.90 By
forcing the branches to deliberate, differing viewpoints are
expressed and compromises are inevitably made, thus

84

Thomas O. Sargentich, The Contemporary Assault on Checks and
Balances, 7 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 231, 240 (1998).
85
Id. at 236.
86
Id. at 237.
87
The second value served by the separation of powers and checks
and balances is to bring together three main governmental actors in
the development of public policy: the House of Representatives,
elected from local districts; the Senate, elected from the states; and
the President, elected in a national electoral contest.
Id. at 239.
88
See id.
89
Id.
90
“[T]he separation of powers and checks and balances tend to promote
deliberation about public values and public purposes.” Id.
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minimizing the possible influence of special interest groups.91 It
would be impossible and, perhaps, counterproductive to draw a
clean line between each branch of government. The separation
of powers doctrine “did not mean that these departments ought
to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each
other.”92 Therefore, the Supreme Court has consistently
solidified the importance of the separation of powers doctrine
and the necessity of judicial review, while recognizing the need
for some interaction among the branches.
B. Application of the Doctrine in Case Law
In J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States93 the Court set
forth the enduring rule governing when Congress may tip the
delicate balance between the three separate powers and delegate
its authority.94 While reaffirming that “Congress may not
delegate its purely legislative power to a commission,”95 the
Court held that legislative delegation is permissible when
Congress has set forth an “intelligible principle”96 to which the
authorized party must adhere.97 Years later, in Mistretta v.
United States,98 the Court reaffirmed Congress’s constitutional
power to delegate its authority in certain situations. Recognizing
that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot
do its job absent an ability to delegate power under general
91

See id. at 239–40. “The key idea is that the requirement of having
each of the named constitutional actors agree on a new statutory standard
makes it harder for a [special interest group] to capture the government.” Id.
at 240.
92
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 78, at 314
(emphasis in original).
93
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928)
(upholding congressional delegation of power to the President to increase or
decrease duties according to the Tariff Act of 1922).
94
Id. at 409.
95
Id. at 408.
96
Id. at 409.
97
Id.
98
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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directives,”99 the Court permitted Congress to delegate drafting
of the federal sentencing guidelines to the United States
Sentencing Commission,100 an independent agency under the
judicial branch of the government.101 Reaffirming the
“intelligible principal”102 doctrine, the Mistretta Court held that
“Congress’ delegation of authority to the Sentencing
Commission [was] sufficiently specific and detailed to meet
constitutional requirements.”103 While upholding congressional
delegations that are sufficiently narrow and precise enough not
to violate the separation of powers, the Supreme Court has
diligently protected the doctrine and struck down legislation that
strays beyond these specifications, or grants too much power to
one branch.104
In recent years, the Court has exercised its power of judicial
review in several cases involving legislation bearing a marked
resemblance to Section 102(c) of the Act.105 For example, in INS
v. Chadha,106 the Court declared a legislative provision
unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers.107 At
issue in Chadha was Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act,108 which allowed either House of Congress to
veto, or invalidate, a decision by the Executive Branch to
99

Id. at 372.
Id. at 374 (upholding Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1987) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et
seq. (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (1988))).
101
An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission,
http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSC_Overview_200906.pdf
(last
visited
November 14, 2009).
102
J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
103
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374.
104
See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998);
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
105
See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (holding a congressional veto
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act unconstitutional).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 959.
108
Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(2)
(repealed by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-615 (1996)).
100
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suspend deportation of an alien residing in the United States.109
The Court began by noting that “[the] principle of separation of
powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of
the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.”110 In analyzing the
provision, the Court held that the House action authorized under
Section 244(c)(2) was essentially legislative action, requiring
conformance with constitutionally established procedures.111
Therefore, the Court held the “congressional veto provision in
§ 244 (c)(2) . . . unconstitutional.”112 The Court felt that the
provision granted too much power to one House of Congress113
and again emphasized the importance of maintaining the specific
constitutional powers of each branch:
The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the
President’s veto, and Congress’ power to override a veto
were intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch
and to protect the people from the improvident exercise
of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To
preserve those checks, and maintain the separation of
109

Id. The Immigration and Nationality Act contained a valid
congressional delegation of Executive Power to the Attorney General. Id.
§ 244(a)(1). The delegation set forth an intelligible principle under which the
Attorney General was authorized to suspend the deportation of an alien
provided that said alien met explicit requirements of the Act, specifically, a
continuous physical presence in the United States during the immediately
preceding seven years, good moral character, and extreme hardship to the
alien or a family member (a United States citizen or lawful permanent
resident) upon deportation. Id.
110
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124
(1976)).
111
The single House action authorized under Section 244(c)(2) did not
fall under any of the four constitutional exceptions allowing one House of
Congress to act alone. Id. at 955.
112
Id. at 959.
113
See id. In his concurrence, Justice Powell argued that such cases,
involving legislative veto provisions, should be decided on a narrower basis,
but nonetheless agreed with the outcome. Justice Powell stated, “when
Congress finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria
for permanent residence in this country it has assumed a judicial function in
violation of the separation of powers.” Id. at 960 (Powell, J., concurring).
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powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each
Branch must not be eroded.114
Further evidence of the Court’s customary protection of the
doctrine can be found in the more recent case Clinton v. City of
New York.115 Despite the district court’s contrary holding in
Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff,116 the legislation struck down
in Clinton is strikingly similar to Section 102(c) of the Act.117 In
the well-known Clinton case, the Court held as unconstitutional
the Line Item Veto Act of 1996118 which gave the President the
power to cancel, or veto, any provision of a bill signed into law
that fell under one of three specified categories.119 The Court,
reaffirming Chadha, held that “[r]epeal of statutes, no less than
enactment, must conform with Art. I,”120 and noted that “[t]here
is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President
to enact, amend, or repeal statutes.”121 Presidential veto power is
authorized only before a bill becomes law and, even then, it
may be “overridden by a two-thirds vote in each House.”122 The
Court further clarified the difference between a permissible
Presidential veto and unconstitutional repeal:
There are important differences between the President’s
“return” of a bill pursuant to Article I, § 7, and the
114
115
116

Id. at 957–58 (majority opinion).
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119, 129 (D.D.C.

2007).
117

See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
Line Item Veto Act of 1996 § 204, 2 U.S.C.S. § 691 (2008),
invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
119
The Line Item Veto Act provided for presidential cancellation of any
provision consisting of “(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget
authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax
benefit,” provided that the cancellation would “(i) reduce the Federal budget
deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm
he national interest” and that the President adhere to explicit guidelines in
considering the cancellation. Id.
120
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (citing
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983)).
121
Id.
122
Id.
118
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exercise of the President’s cancellation authority pursuant
to the Line Item Veto Act. The constitutional return takes
place before the bill becomes law; the statutory
cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law. The
constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory
cancellation is of only a part. Although the Constitution
expressly authorizes the President to play a role in the
process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of
unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends
parts of duly enacted statutes.123
The Court interpreted this silence as “equivalent to an
express prohibition.”124 Because the Framers went to such
lengths to specify the procedures necessary for statutory
enactment, the Court found that the omission of any language
authorizing post-enactment repeal prohibits such action.125 Thus,
the Court held that the end result of legislation affected by the
Line Item Veto Act would not be “the product of the ‘finely
wrought procedure’ the Framers designed.”126 Justice Kennedy
clearly articulated the non-delegation principle, asserting that
“[b]y increasing the power of the President beyond what the
Framers envisioned, the statute compromises the political liberty
of our citizens, liberty which the separation of powers seeks to
secure.”127 Notably, Kennedy’s statement also describes Section
102(c) of the Act, which has not been struck down and is still in
force today.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 102(C) OF THE REAL ID
ACT
A. Comparison to Clinton v. City of New York
Similar to the Line Item Veto Act, Section 102(c) of the
123
124
125
126
127

Id. at 438–39.
Id. at 439.
See id.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Real ID Act vests too much power in one individual. Moreover,
because the power is vested in the secretary of an administrative
agency, a politically appointed position, the statute represents an
especially drastic deviation from the Framers’ vision.128 Further,
the power granted to the President under the Line Item Veto Act
was subject to more restrictions than that granted to the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security under Section
102(c) of the Real ID Act. While the Line Item Veto Act set
forth specific requirements for the provisions subject to
cancellation,129 it also provided for a built in check on the
President’s cancellation power.130 By contrast, the Real ID Act
provides no specific requirements for the waiver of laws; the
Secretary is granted “authority to waive all legal requirements
such Secretary, in such Secretary’s sole discretion, determines
necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and
roads.”131
There is no built in check on the Secretary’s power. The
Secretary’s waiver decision can only be examined through
judicial review;132 therefore, unless a party with standing files
suit, the decision will go unchecked. Significantly, even if a
party with standing seeks judicial review, the narrow
requirements for such a suit make it highly unlikely to
128

See supra note 79.
See supra note 119.
130
A cancellation takes effect upon receipt by Congress of the
special message from the President. If, however, a “disapproval
bill” pertaining to a special message is enacted into law, the
cancellations set forth in that message become “null and void.” The
Act sets forth a detailed expedited procedure for the consideration of
a “disapproval bill” . . . . A majority vote of both Houses is
sufficient to enact a disapproval bill. The Act does not grant the
President the authority to cancel a disapproval bill, but he does, of
course, retain constitutional authority to veto such a bill.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436–37 (1998) (citing 2
U.S.C.S. § 691).
131
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(c)(1), 119
Stat. 231 (2005).
132
See supra text accompanying note 23.
129
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succeed.133 Though the separation of powers violations in the
Real ID Act are more flagrant than those embodied in the Line
Item Veto Act, the two statutes, nevertheless, bear remarkable
similarities.
The Court in Clinton explicitly stated that “[t]he cancellation
of one section of a statute may be the functional equivalent of a
partial repeal even if a portion of the section is not cancelled.”134
In Clinton, a partial repeal was held unconstitutional under
Article I, Section 7.135 A “partial repeal” is precisely what the
Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized to do under the
Real ID Act.136 By refusing to apply any and all statutes he
deems necessary along the border, the Secretary is in effect
partially repealing these statutes.137 While the district court held
that this did not constitute a partial repeal because a waived law
“retains the same legal force and effect as it had when it was
passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the
President,”138 this is clearly not the case. When statutes,
particularly environmental ones, are enacted they are intended to
protect specific places or things deemed especially valuable to
society and to ensure the safety and health of citizens.139 How
can it logically be argued that these statutes are not being
partially repealed when they exempt over 700 miles of United
States land,140 containing various endangered species141 and
133

See id.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 441 (1998).
135
Id. at 444.
136
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss,
Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007) (No.
07-1801); Plaintiff’s Lodged Surreply to Defendants’ Renewed Motion to
Dismiss, Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (No. 07-1801).
137
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Renewed Motion, supra note
136; Plaintiff’s Lodged Surreply, supra note 136.
138
Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 124.
139
See supra note 36.
140
8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (b)(1)(A) (West 2009) (Improvement of
Barriers at Border).
141
Defenders of Wildlife, Border Fence Construction: San Pedro
Riparian
NCA,
http://www.defenders.org/programs_and_policy/in_the_
courts/legal_docket/border_fence_construction_san_pedro_riparian_nca.php
134
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specifically designated as a conservation area?142 When statutes
are not applied to several of the items they were designed to
protect, they are being partially repealed.
While the district court stated that labeling the Secretary’s
actions under the Real ID Act a partial repeal would invalidate
“numerous other statutory authorizations of executive
waivers,”143 this reasoning is flawed. The statutory waiver
authorizations cited by the district court in support of this
proposition were far more specific and detailed than the
sweeping authorization in Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act.144
Further, the Line Item Veto Act “require[d] the President to
adhere to precise procedures whenever he exercises his
cancellation authority. In identifying items for cancellation he
must consider the legislative history, the purposes, and other
relevant information about the items,”145 while the Real ID Act
requires no such consideration and is entirely discretionary on

(last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
142
See supra note 29.
143
Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 125.
144
The court cited:
10 U.S.C. § 433 (Secretary of Defense, “in connection with a
commercial activity,” may waive compliance with “certain Federal
laws or regulations pertaining to the management and administration
of Federal agencies” if they would “create an unacceptable risk of
compromise of an authorized intelligence activity”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2621 (EPA may waive compliance with Toxic Substances Act
“upon a request and determination by the President that the
requested waiver is necessary in the interest of national defense.”);
20 U.S.C. § 7426(e) (Secretaries of the Interior, Labor, Health and
Human Services, and Education “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law. . . shall have the authority to waive any regulation,
policy, or procedure promulgated by [their] department” necessary
for the integration of education and related services provided to
Indian students); 22 U.S.C. § 7207(a)(3) (President may waive a
statutory prohibition on assistance to certain countries “to the degree
[he] determines that it is in the national security interest of the
United States to do so, or for humanitarian reasons”).
Id. at 125 n.5.
145
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436 (1998).
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the part of the Secretary.146 This raises the obvious question of
why there is such incongruence between the Supreme Court’s
management of the two Acts. After declaring the Line Item Veto
Act unconstitutional, the Court declined to test the
constitutionality of the Real ID Act,147 thereby permitting a
violation of the separation of powers.
B. Comparison to INS v. Chadha
Similar inconsistency can be seen when comparing the
Court’s inaction in Defenders of Wildlife to its holding in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.148 The
legislative veto at issue in Chadha was, as the Court conceded, a
“convenient shortcut.”149 However, while acknowledging that a
one House veto was “on its face, an appealing compromise,” the
Court stated that “it is crystal clear from the records of the
Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the
Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.”150 Allowing
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to waive
“all legal requirements . . . [he] determines necessary to ensure
expeditious construction”151 of border fences and roads clearly
has the appeal of swift action. During the period of increasing
xenophobia following September 11th, the rapid completion of
border reinforcements became desirable to many government
152
officials and American citizens alike. However, as the Court
146

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109–13, § 102(c)(1), 119
Stat. 231 (2005).
147
Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 128 S. Ct. 2962 (2008).
148
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
(holding one-House veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act
unconstitutional).
149
Id. at 958.
150
Id. at 958–59.
151
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(1).
152
See Jeffrey M. Jones, Nearly Half of Americans Say Immigration
Levels Should Be Decreased, GALLUP, July 10, 2003, http://www.gallup.
com/poll/8815/Nearly-Half-Americans-Say-Immigration-Levels-ShouldDecreased.aspx.
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noted in Chadha, “[t]he choices we discern as having been made
in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on
governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even
unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by
men who had lived under a form of government that permitted
arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked.”153 Of course it is a
convenient shortcut to waive any and all statutes that would
interfere with border reinforcements, most of which are
environmental and would require surveys and the possible
alteration of construction plans. However, the separation of
powers doctrine forbids such an unrestrained grant of power to
one individual and, as the Court stated in Chadha, “[t]here is no
support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the
proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often
encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards
may be avoided, either by Congress or by the President.”154
Simply put, no branch of government may discount the carefully
constructed constitutional system of separation of powers and
checks and balances in the interest of efficiency.
This tension between expediency and constitutionality is not
the only parallel between Section 244(c)(1) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act and Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act.155
Both acts deal with the power to nullify constitutionally valid
decisions or statutes.156 Clearly, the doctrine of checks and
balances places great emphasis on the value of internal
government regulation.157 However, this process was carefully
laid out in the Constitution and the power to nullify proposed
158
legislation was delegated to the President. This delegation of
power “was based on the profound conviction of the Framers
that the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be

153

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
Id. (referencing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952)).
155
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(2).
156
See supra text accompanying notes 19, 109.
157
See supra note 79.
158
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
154
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most carefully circumscribed.”159 Because no such veto power
was conferred elsewhere, the Court in Chadha held that the
ability of one House of Congress to void a constitutionally valid
decision of the Executive Branch was unconstitutional.160
Similarly, the ability of one Executive Branch administrative
agency officer to waive any and all statutes he deems necessary
far exceeds the Framers’ precisely carved out veto provision.161
The current system is far from perfect, but as the Court aptly
stated in Chadha, “[w]ith all the obvious flaws of delay,
untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a
better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of
power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution.”162
It is when these explicit constitutional procedures begin to
erode in the name of convenience that the entire system of
government is in danger. While there exists a natural push and
pull between the three branches, it is expected that when
legislation extends beyond constitutional boundaries, the Court
will step in and perform its function as a legislative check.163
These decisions will not always be straightforward. As the Court
stated in Chadha, “[q]uestions may occur which we would
gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to
exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our
duty.”164 However, instead of performing its constitutionally
appointed duty, the Court chose to avoid the issue in Defenders
of Wildlife. Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act should have been
evaluated by the Court and declared unconstitutional for
violating the separation of powers doctrine, specifically its
nondelegation doctrine.

159

Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947

(1983).
160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 959.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
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C. The Intelligible Principle Requirement of the
Nondelegation Doctrine
Recognizing that, in an ever-changing, complicated society,
circumstances would necessarily arise in which congressional
delegation of authority was warranted, the Supreme Court set
forth strict guidelines for such delegation in J.W. Hampton Jr.,
& Co. v. United States.165 Under the nondelegation doctrine,
Congress may enact legislation delegating some of its
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies as long as the
legislation sets forth an “intelligible principle” to which the
agency must adhere.166 Because Congress had provided explicit
167
guidelines in the Tariff Act of 1922, its delegation of tariff
adjustment duties to the President was held constitutional in
Hampton.168 Specifically, the President was only permitted to
169
adjust tariffs when certain requirements were met. Congress
also provided a detailed list of factors for the President to
consider in making his determination.170 Investigations were
165

J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
Id. at 409.
167
Tariff Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 941–943
(repealed 1930).
168
J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. 394.
169
When the difference between the domestic production cost of a
product and the production cost of the product in a competing foreign country
was not equalized by the current tariff, the President was authorized to adjust
the tariff in order to achieve equalization. Id. at 401.
170
(c). That in ascertaining the differences in costs of production,
under the provisions of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, the
President, in so far as he finds it practicable, shall take into
consideration (1) the differences in conditions in production,
including wages, costs of material, and other items in costs of
production of such or similar articles in the United States and in
competing foreign countries; (2) the differences in the wholesale
selling prices of domestic and foreign articles in the principal
markets of the United States; (3) advantages granted to a foreign
producer by a foreign government, or by a person, partnership,
corporation, or association in a foreign country; and (4) any other
advantages or disadvantages in competition.
Id. at 401–02 (quoting Tariff Act Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat.
166
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required prior to the tariff adjustments, including public
hearings.171 Further, Congress included restrictions prohibiting
the “transfer of an article from the dutiable list to the free list or
from the free list to the dutiable list, [or] a change in form of
duty” and specified that the adjustments were subject to reversal
when the requirements were no longer met.172 Thus, Congress
delegated its power under detailed criteria in the Tariff Act and
the Court utilized these standards when setting forth the
“intelligible principle” doctrine.173
The Court further defined the “intelligible principle” concept
in the more recent case, Mistretta v. United States, where it
stated that in order for a delegation to be constitutionally valid,
Congress must “clearly delineat[e] the general policy, the public
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated
authority.”174 The Court again found a constitutional delegation
because in delegating authority to the United States Sentencing
Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines under the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,175 Congress set forth numerous
parameters. Using a formula similar to the Tariff Act, Congress
articulated precise requirements for the formation of the
sentencing guidelines,176 provided factors to be considered by the
941–943 (repealed 1930)).
171
Investigations to assist the President in ascertaining differences in
costs of production under this section shall be made by the United
States Tariff Commission, and no proclamation shall be issued under
this section until such investigation shall have been made. The
commission shall give reasonable public notice of its hearings and
shall give reasonable opportunity to parties interested to be present,
to produce evidence, and to be heard.
Id. at 402.
172
Id.
173
See id. at 409.
174
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (quoting
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).
175
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C.
§ 991–98 (2008).
176
Congress instructed the Commission that these sentencing ranges
must be consistent with pertinent provisions of Title 18 of the United
States Code and could not include sentences in excess of the
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Commission,177 and set forth specific restrictions.178 Additionally,
the Commission was given a list of what the newly formed
guidelines were required to include.179 Because, “in addition to
statutory maxima. Congress also required that for sentences of
imprisonment, “the maximum of the range established for such a
term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the
greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term
of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life
imprisonment.” Moreover, Congress directed the Commission to use
current average sentences “as a starting point” for its structuring of
the sentencing ranges.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374–75 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994).
177
To guide the Commission in its formulation of offense categories,
Congress directed it to consider seven factors: the grade of the
offense; the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime;
the nature and degree of the harm caused by the crime; the
community view of the gravity of the offense; the public concern
generated by the crime; the deterrent effect that a particular sentence
may have on others; and the current incidence of the offense.
Congress set forth 11 factors for the Commission to consider in
establishing categories of defendants. These include the offender’s
age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition,
physical condition (including drug dependence), previous
employment record, family ties and responsibilities, community ties,
role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of dependence upon
crime for a livelihood.
Id. at 375–76 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994).
178
“Congress also prohibited the Commission from considering the ‘race,
sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders,’ and
instructed that the guidelines should reflect the ‘general inappropriateness’ of
considering certain other factors, such as current unemployment, that might
serve as proxies for forbidden factors.” Id. at 376 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994).
179
Congress mandated that the guidelines include: “(A) a
determination whether to impose a sentence to probation, a fine, or a
term of imprisonment; (B) a determination as to the appropriate
amount of a fine or the appropriate length of a term of probation or
a term of imprisonment; (C) a determination whether a sentence to a
term of imprisonment should include a requirement that the
defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after
imprisonment, and, if so, the appropriate length of such a term; and
(D) a determination whether multiple sentences to terms of
imprisonment should be ordered to run concurrently or
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these overarching constraints, Congress provided even more
detailed guidance to the Commission,”180 the Court found that
the intelligible principal standard had actually been exceeded and
“in actuality [Congress] legislated a full hierarchy of
punishment.”181 Nonetheless, the “intelligible principle” doctrine
was reaffirmed and further elucidated by the Court.182 It is clear
from both Hampton and Mistretta that in order to be
constitutional, a congressional delegation must set forth more
than a general directive.183 Rather, it must include definite
standards to guide the agency in its decision-making.184
The absolute lack of standards in Section 102(c) of the Real
ID Act is a glaring violation of the nondelegation doctrine. In
fact, it is difficult to compare the Act to Hampton and Mistretta
because there are virtually no guidelines in Section 102(c) on
which to base a comparison.185 Both the Tariff Act and the
Sentencing Reform Act began with specific requirements that
had to be met in order for the designated authority to act.186 The
only requirement in Section 102(c) is the wholly discretionary
opinion of the Secretary that the action is “necessary to ensure
expeditious construction of the barriers and roads.”187 This is
hardly the same kind of standard upheld in Hampton and
Mistretta. While the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act sets forth several factors to be considered in
erecting the border fences,188 the Secretary is not directed to
consecutively.”
Id. at 374 n.8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)).
180
Id. at 376.
181
Id. at 377.
182
Id. at 372–77.
183
See id.; J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394
(1928).
184
See Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361; J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. 394.
185
See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109–13,
§ 102(c)(1), 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
186
See supra text accompanying notes 145, 154.
187
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(1).
188
In general. In carrying out this section, the Secretary of
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consider any factors in making his determination of statutory
waivers.189 Thus, while the Secretary may choose to consider the
aforementioned factors, the language of the Real ID Act does
not require him to.190 Rather, the only guiding principle is his
“sole discretion.”191 He is simply authorized to “waive all legal
requirements.”192 This absence of any meaningful restriction on
the Secretary’s authority is an unprecedented deviation from the
“intelligible principle” standard.
The district court’s finding that the specifications of areas of
“high illegal entry,” deterring “illegal crossings,” and
“necessary to ensure expeditious construction” constitute
sufficient guiding principles is not convincing.193 Imagine a
similar directive in Mistretta. Surely the Court would not have
upheld a delegation to the Sentencing Commission to promulgate
sentencing guidelines that the Commission, in its sole discretion,
deemed necessary to punish criminals. Likewise, the Tariff Act
delegation in Hampton would not have passed constitutional
muster had it delegated power to the President to adjust any
tariffs he deemed necessary in the interest of equality between
domestic and foreign production or, even more akin to
Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, allowed the President to waive
such tariffs. The holding in Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff is
clearly at odds with both landmark nondelegation cases.
At the same time, Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act bears a
striking resemblance to legislation the Court has previously

Homeland Security shall consult with the Secretary of the Interior,
the Secretary of Agriculture, States, local governments, Indian
tribes, and property owners in the United States to minimize the
impact on the environment, culture, commerce, and quality of life
for the communities and residents located near the sites at which
such fencing is to be constructed.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (b)(1)(C)(i) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers at
Border).
189
See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(1).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
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struck down on nondelegation grounds.194 In Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, the Court found the congressional delegation under
Section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933195
“without constitutional authority.”196 In an effort to regulate the
national oil industry, Section 9(c) delegated power to the
President to enforce limits on oil transportation.197 However,
similar to Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act, this delegation
lacked a sufficient intelligible principle.198 The Court noted,
“Section 9(c) does not state whether, or in what circumstances
or under what conditions, the President is to [act under the given
authority] . . . . It establishes no criterion to govern the
President’s course . . . [and] does not require any finding by the
President as a condition of his action.”199 Likewise, Section
102(c) of the Real ID Act provides no guide for when the
Secretary may or may not exercise his statutory waiver
authority. The district court found that the phrase “areas of high
illegal entry,” in reference to fencing sites, constituted a

194

See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
National Industry Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73–67, § 9(c), 48 Stat.
195, 200 (1933), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
196
Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 433.
197
(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in
interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products
thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount
permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any state
law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any
board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a
State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under the
provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to
exceed $ 1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or
both.
National Industry Recovery Act § 9(c).
198
“As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state
permission, the Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard,
has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of
circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or
prohibited.” Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430.
199
Id. at 415.
195
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sufficient guideline.200 However, there is no definition for this
term anywhere within the Real ID Act.201 It is mentioned but
once in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, without providing even general criteria.202
The other guideline, what the Secretary deems “necessary,”203 is
even more subjective, open to almost limitless interpretation.
The Court’s characterization of Section 9(c) in Panama Refining
Co. is an all too apt description of Section 102(c) of the Real ID
Act.204 Section 9(c) actually provided more direction by
furnishing distinct rules for the President to follow,205 whereas
the Real ID Act relegates decision-making to the Secretary’s sole
discretion. Nonetheless, the Court in Panama Refining Co. held
the delegation unconstitutional because it provided “the President
an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down
the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.”206 This
is precisely the type of authority Section 102(c) of the Real ID
Act grants to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Panama Refining Co. is not the only example of the Court’s
207
incongruous treatment of Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff. In
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Court

200

Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119, 128 (D.D.C.

2007).
201

See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231 (2005).
202
8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (a) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers at
Border).
203
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 102(c)(1).
204
Id.; see also supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text.
205
The President was required to use state laws, regulations, or orders as
the benchmark for permitted transportation quantities. National Industry
Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1933),
invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935).
206
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1934).
207
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
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struck down another unconstitutional congressional delegation.208
The legislation at issue in Schechter, Section 3 of the National
Industrial Recovery Act,209 again bore a strong resemblance to
Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act. Under Section 3, the
President was granted authority to approve industry codes of
“fair competition.”210 “Fair competition” was not defined in the
National Industrial Recovery Act,211 just as “high illegal entry”
and “necessary” are not defined in the Real ID Act.212 Due to
208

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. 495.
National Industry Recovery Act § 3.
210
Id.
(a) Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or
industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code
or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry or subdivision
thereof, represented by the applicant or applicants, if the President
finds (1) that such associations or groups impose no inequitable
restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly
representative of such trades or industries or subdivisions thereof,
and (2) that such code or codes are not designed to promote
monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not
operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the
policy of this title: Provided, That such code or codes shall not
permit monopolies or monopolistic practices: Provided further, That
where such code or codes affect the services and welfare of persons
engaged in other steps of the economic process, nothing in this
section shall deprive such persons of the right to be heard prior to
approval by the President of such code or codes. The President may,
as a condition of his approval of any such code, impose such
conditions (including requirements for the making of reports and the
keeping of accounts) for the protection of consumers, competitors,
employees, and others, and in furtherance of the public interest, and
may provide such exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions
of such code, as the President in his discretion deems necessary to
effectuate the policy herein declared.
Id. § 3(a).
211
The Court struggled to find a definition, referencing sources such as
the common law and the Federal Trade Commission Act. A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry, 295 U.S. at 531–35.
212
See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231 (2005).
209
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the ambiguous language, the Court in Schechter found that
Section 3 supplied “no standards for any trade, industry or
activity.”213 Further, the Court held that it lacked sufficient
guidelines “aside from the statement of the general aims of
rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in section
one.”214 A “statement of general aims” is precisely what
Congress set forth in Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act. The
Secretary is directed to use his discretion in furtherance of the
broad goals of “deter[ing] illegal crossings”215 and “ensur[ing]
expeditious construction” of barriers.216 It was exactly this sort
of directive in Schechter that led the Court to hold, “[i]n view of
the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few
restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the
President . . . is virtually unfettered” and, therefore, “an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”217 This begs the
obvious question of why the Court did not come to the same
conclusion in Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff. The Secretary’s
limitless statutory waiver authority is a clear violation of the
nondelegation doctrine. Given the Court’s intelligible principle
jurisprudence, it is clear that the congressional delegation in
Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act is unconstitutional.
IV. DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S INACTION
A. Environmental Effects
The Secretary’s vast power is only exacerbated by the
drastically limited options for review provided by the Real ID
218
Given the narrow restrictions placed on judicial
Act.
213

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541.
Id.
215
8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 note (a) (West 2009) (Improvement of Barriers at
Border).
216
Id. § 1103 note (c)(1).
217
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541–42.
218
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102(c)(2), 119
Stat. 231 (2005).
214
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intervention,219 the Court’s denial of certiorari was especially
troublesome. Unfortunately, the Court’s inaction will likely have
a lasting effect on the environment. Defenders of Wildlife
warned that construction of the border fence in the SPRNCA
would “fragment[] critical corridors for wildlife, including
jaguars, black bear . . . and many other species.”220 This
presents an especially dire situation for the endangered jaguars
whose long-term survival is dependent upon their ability to roam
over a large area.221 In addition, the fence would block
“numerous desert washes feeding the San Pedro River and
floodplain, resulting in erosion and sedimentation into the river,
which provides habitat for hundreds of breeding, migratory, and
wintering bird species, as well as more than 80 species of
mammals.”222
Further, the Bureau of Land Management, whose initial
Environmental Assessment (EA) found “no significant
environmental impact,”223 subsequently issued a supplemental
memorandum following a visit to the fence site.224 The memo
expressed serious concerns about floods resulting from debris
build-up on the fence.225 It continued, “[t]he timing and intensity
of seasonal flood flows in the San Pedro River are essential for
maintaining riparian function as well as recharging the alluvial
aquifer. Regardless of the maintenance commitments by Border
Patrol, the proposed/existing fence could inadvertently act as a
flood control structure altering natural flood characteristics.”226

219

See supra text accompanying note 19.
Border Fence Construction, supra note 141.
221
Joe Zentner, Jaguars on the Fence, DESERT USA, http://www.desert
usa.com/mag06/dec/jaguars.html.
222
Border Fence Construction, supra note 141.
223
Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D.D.C.
2007).
224
Memorandum from the Bureau of Land Management, BLM EA #AZ420-2007-051 Supplement (Oct. 4, 2007), available at http://www.biological
diversity.org/programs/public_lands/rivers/san_pedro_river/pdfs/blm-foiaresp-040808-BLM-concerns-100407.pdf.
225
Id.
226
Id.
220
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Notably, the supplemental memo was issued several weeks prior
to Chertoff’s waiver.227 Chertoff only cited to the initial EA’s
finding of “no significant environmental impact” in support of
his waiver decision.228
Unfortunately, the memo proved to be an accurate predictor.
In July of 2008, the combination of heavy rains and border
fencing in southwestern Arizona resulted in severe flooding at
the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument.229 According to
news reports, the flooding was caused by “debris and water
backup [at the fence] during a . . . storm.”230 Just as many fence
opponents feared,
[r]apidly moving runoff in washes dislodged or eroded
large chunks of concrete foundations, and debris stacking
up against the fence itself created barriers or dams
redirecting the water, creating gullies and causing even
more erosion . . . . It created backwater pools up to
seven feet deep and lateral flows several hundred feet
wide that moved out of the washes, eroding some areas
along patrol roads. The waters even scoured some fence
and vehicle barrier foundations.231
Despite these seemingly prophetic events, fence construction
at the SPRNCA continued. Unlike Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument, the plans for SPRNCA include movable barriers in
the riverbed that may be removed to minimize affecting water

227

Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as Amended by Section
102 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and as Amended by the Secure Fence Act
of 206, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,870 (Oct. 26, 2007).
228
Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Department of Homeland
Security: Statement Regarding Exercise of Waiver Authority (Oct. 2007),
available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/public_lands/rivers/
san_pedro_river/pdfs/dhs-EXEMPTION-statement-200710.pdf.
229
The flooding occurred at the port of entry at Lukeville, Arizona and
Sonoyta Sonora, Mexico. Arthur H. Rotstein, Border Fence Causing
Flooding Trouble, TUCSON CITIZEN, Aug. 24, 2008, http://www.tucson
citizen.com/ss/local/94705.php.
230
Id.
231
Id.
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flow.232 However, recognizing the irony of placing removable
barriers in an area known for flash floods, one critic stated,
“[i]t’s a joke . . . [l]ike they’re going to anticipate when it’s
going to flood and they’re going to go out and remove them.”233
Thus, the SPRNCA remains vulnerable to destruction similar to
that experienced at Organ Pipe.234
B. Political Consequences
While the environmental effects of the Court’s inaction are
potentially devastating, so are the political ramifications if the
Court stays this course. The “separation of powers framework
was designed to prevent special interests from co-opting the
government . . . . [T]hese special interests must convince three
different groups with three different constituencies of the
correctness of their proposals.”235 Consequently, the erosion of
the separation of powers doctrine by Section 102(c) of the Real
ID Act provides special interest groups with the ability to wield
extensive influence simply by swaying the judgment of one
individual. In Chadha, the Court recognized the danger in such
a situation, noting that the purpose of congressional power to
override a presidential veto is to “preclud[e] final arbitrary
action of one person.”236 However, final arbitrary action is
precisely what Chertoff exercised in his waiver of the twenty
statutes.237
While the direct effects of Section 102(c) are disconcerting,
232

Howard Fischer, BLM: Border Barriers Would Harm San Pedro Area,
EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE, Apr. 27, 2008, http://www.eastvalleytribune.
com/story/114902.
233
Id. (quoting Sandy Bahr, Sierra Club).
234
See supra text accompanying notes 226, 231.
235
Michael G. Locklar, Is the 1996 Line-Item Veto Constitutional?, 34
HOUS. L. REV. 1161, 1179 (1997).
236
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951
(1983).
237
See Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as Amended by Section
102 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and as Amended by the Secure Fence Act
of 206, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,870 (Oct. 26, 2007).
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an even larger potential problem exists if the Court stays the
course of inaction while similar unconstitutional legislation is
enacted. The danger in violating the separation of powers
doctrine and, thus, allowing special interest groups increased
power over legislation is embodied in the very title of these
groups. Special interests strive to further the goals of specific
sects of society, as opposed to the general public.238 Because
these groups vary in size and funding, the more powerful groups
tend to be those with the most funding.239 A system that
facilitates the interests of the affluent while ignoring those with
less means drastically deviates from the Framers’ vision of equal
representation and protection from “improvident laws.”240
However, well-funded special interests are not the only
danger associated with the deterioration of the separation of
powers doctrine. Political parties also represent different sects of
society, at times greatly at odds with one another. Upon its first
introduction, the Real ID Act was passed in the House of
Representatives with ninety-six percent of Republicans voting for
it and seventy-eight percent of Democrats voting against it.241
238

Some well known special interest groups include the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), AntiDefamation League, and Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders
(GLAD). Political Advocacy Groups, A Directory of United States
Lobbyists,
http://www.vancouver.wsu.edu/fac/kfountain/alpha.html
(last
visited Sept. 28, 2009).
239
A Fortune Magazine survey confirmed “the more money a group
spent on its plain old lobbying efforts in Washington, the more influence it
wielded.” Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Follow the Money. Hard Money. Soft
Money. Lobbying Money. Which Buys the Most Influence in Washington?
FORTUNE’s Power 25 Survey Attempts an Answer and Ranks the Top
Lobbying Groups, FORTUNE, Dec. 6, 1999. According to Fortune’s Power 25
survey, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) was the most
powerful lobbying group, while the National Rifle Association was tied for
second place. Id.
240
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
241
Brian Murphy, The Real ID Act of 2005: Tightening the Burden on
Asylum Seekers, Federal Standards for Driver’s Licenses, and Patching a
Hole in a Border Fence at the Cost of Other Legislation, 19 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 191, 191 (2004) (citations omitted). The bill was not passed due to
opposition in the Senate. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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This disparity illustrates the profound divide between the two
political parties. It also serves as a warning against granting
sweeping authority to one individual. Despite the expected
uneven distribution of representatives in Congress, the presence
of both parties encourages dialogue and debate regarding
important legislative matters. In stark contrast, the delegation of
broad authority to one individual requires no debate. Legislation,
such as Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act, leaves important
legislative matters to the discretion of one individual and,
consequently, the unfettered will of one political party.
Ironically, the Court’s negligence in addressing this violation of
separation of powers means that the solution will likely come
from exertion of political party power.
V. A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION TO THE COURT’S FAILURE AS A
LEGISLATIVE CHECK
Fortunately, some legislators are aware of the
unconstitutionality of Section 102(c).242 As illustrated by the
original House vote in 2005, the majority of those legislators are
Democrats.243 In fact, in June of 2007 U.S. Rep. Raul Grijalva,
D-Ariz., introduced legislation that would have repealed the
Secretary’s waiver authority granted under the Real ID Act.244
The Borderlands Conservation and Security Act245 not only
provided for the outright repeal of Section 102(c) of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
but also required the Secretary to:
develop a border protection strategy that supports the
border security needs of the United States in a manner
that best protects—(A) units of the National Park System;
(B) National Forest System land; (C) land under the
242

Forty-eight U.S. Representatives, all of whom were Democrats, cosponsored the Borderlands Conservation and Security Act that, if passed,
would have repealed Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act. Borderlands
Conservation and Security Act of 2007, H.R. 2593, 110th Cong. (2007).
243
See supra text accompanying note 241.
244
H.R. 2593.
245
Id.
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jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management; (D) land
under the jurisdiction of the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service; and (E) other relevant land under the
jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior or the
Department of Agriculture.246
U.S. Rep. Earl Blumenauer, a fellow Democrat, expressed
support for the bill, stating “[i]t is unprecedented that a single
person can be above the law without any judicial appeal or
remedy . . . . And it is absurd to claim that he must waive the
Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean Air Act, to name a few, in
order to build this border fence.”247 Unfortunately, the bill
stalled in committee shortly after its introduction.248 As a result it
was “cleared from the books” upon termination of the 110th
congressional session.249 There is still hope that the Democratic
250
victory in the recent election may revive the bill or lead to
similar legislation.251 This corrective legislative action is
necessary due to the Court’s failure to perform its duty as a
legislative check. While such congressional action would correct
246

Id. § 4(a)(1). The Secretary is directed to develop the protection plan
in cooperation with the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
Agriculture. Id.
247
David McLemore, Fight Over Border Fence Environmental Waivers
Could Reach Supreme Court, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 15, 2008,
(quoting U.S. Rep. Earl Blumenauer, D-Ore.).
248
The Bill was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security,
Committee on Natural Resources, and Committee on Agriculture on June 6,
2007. H.R. 2593.
249
GovTrack, H.R. 2593: Borderlands Conservation and Security Act of
2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2593 (last visited
Sept. 28, 2009).
250
The Democratic Party won majority control of both Houses of
Congress in 2008. House of Representatives Big Board Election Results 2008,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/house/
votes.html; Senate Big Board Election Results 2008, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2008, http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/senate/votes.html.
251
Legislation has already been introduced in the House and Senate that
would repeal Title II of the Real Id Act, the section requiring national ID
cards. REAL ID Repeal and Identification Security Enhancement Act of
2009, H.R. 3471, 111th Cong. (2009); Providing for Additional Security in
States’ Identification Act of 2009, S. 1261, 111th Cong. (2009).
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the separation of powers violation, it is likely too late to mitigate
the damage to border lands and wildlife. The 670 miles of
border fence originally slated for December 31, 2008
completion252 are now nearly finished.253 Additionally, Rep.
Grijalva admits that the poor state of the economy254 means the
Act is no longer a congressional priority.255 Unfortunately,
Section 102(c) of the Real ID Act may now be relegated to
serving as a warning beacon for future legislators.
If Congress recognizes its prior error, it may be more
cautious before enacting future legislation that threatens the
separation of powers doctrine. As Professor Jonathan Turley, a
constitutional law scholar at George Washington University
explained, “there is no evidence Congress considered the
implications of giving Homeland Security such broad waiver
power.”256 As Congress now realizes the consequences of
granting such sweeping authority, it may be more diligent in
analyzing the effects of future delegations. The full
environmental cost of this lesson remains to be seen, but its

252

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See Department of Homeland Security, Southwest Border Fence
Construction Status Map, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/
highlights/fence_map.ctt/fence_map.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).
254
See Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Chief Defends Steps Taken to Contain
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009.
255
“There’s a shift in priorities now with the economy . . . . Throwing
$450 million at a fence pales in comparison to fixing our economy.” Melissa
Del Bosque, Back to the Wall, TEXAS OBSERVER, Feb. 6, 2009 (quoting U.S.
Rep. Raul Grijalva).
256
McLemore, supra note 247 (quoting Prof. Jonathan Turley, George
Washington University). Professor Turley:
is a nationally recognized legal scholar who has written extensively
in areas ranging from constitutional law to legal theory to tort law . .
. . He has served as a consultant on homeland security and
constitutional issues, and is a frequent witness before the House and
Senate on constitutional and statutory issues as well as tort reform
legislation.
George Washington University Law School, Jonathan Turley, http://www.
law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=1738 (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
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significance should not be underestimated.257 As one Defender’s
of Wildlife representative stated, “[w]hen you disregard
environmental laws, it leads to real adverse impacts . . . . It’s
not just an academic argument.”258

257

See supra text accompanying notes 226, 231.
Del Bosque, supra note 255 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife federal
lands associate Noah Kahn).
258

